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Abstract – Covert communication is a rapidly expanding field 
of research with significant impact on the security theater. 
These communication methods, or “covert channels”, can be 
applied in a number of ways, including as a mechanism for an 
attacker to leak data from a monitored system or network. 
This paper sets out to contribute to this field by introducing a 
new covert channel which operates over transport layer 
protocols. The mechanism is flexible, covert, and has the 
potential to operate at relatively high bandwidth. In addition, 
this paper proposes a number of encoding schemes which can 
be used in conjunction with this channel to improve its 
bandwidth and covertness. 
Keywords: Network Covert Channels, Information Hiding, 
Network Security 
 
1 Introduction 
A covert channel can be defined as any communication 
method where both the data being transmitted and the 
existence of the channel itself are hidden from network and 
system authority figures. The field has generated much 
interest because of its applications on both sides of the 
information security industry; while covert channels are useful 
for defensive security applications and collaboration between 
legitimate security teams, they can also be used by attackers to 
covertly leak data from a secure environment.  
This paper presents a novel method for leveraging 
transport layer source ports as a medium for covert 
communication. The technique is flexible and can be applied 
in a wide variety of environments.  The paper then discusses a 
number of possible implementations of this channel. It will 
also introduce a collection of encoding mechanisms to use in 
conjunction with the channel and will review their utility. 
Some of these encoding techniques provide data integrity and 
obfuscate the channel from a would-be investigator. 
 
2 Related Work 
Covert channels have been the subject of research for 
some time. They were originally defined in [1] as any 
communication medium not designed or intended for data 
transfer but could be used as such. Multiple types of covert 
channels have been defined, including storage channels, 
timing channels and behavioral channels. This topic was 
explored in depth in [2]. A storage channel is essentially any 
channel where a shared storage medium is used to encode and 
transmit information. A timing channel is any communication 
which relies on the time between particular events to encode 
and transmit information, instead of shared storage media. 
Behavioral channels are broadly defined as any channel where 
the mechanism is non-stored and time independent. 
The channels covered in [1] are exclusively single 
system process-to-process examples. Since then, the definition 
of a covert channel has gradually expanded to include 
channels between processes on two separate machines over a 
computer network. [3] provided solid groundwork for creating 
TCP/IP timing channels. The approach encoded data in the 
amount of time between to the arrival of two packets. TCP/IP 
storage channels were thoroughly examined in [4]. In this 
work, data is transmitted in header fields of TCP/IP packets. 
Two known works have identified transport layer source ports 
as a potential channel medium in passing but did not discuss 
how it might be accomplished [5] [6].  
 
3 Covert Channel Over Source Ports 
This section defines and outlines a method for using 
transport layer source ports as a covert channel. A technical 
background will be provided in subsection 3.1. The method 
itself is introduced in 3.2. The final subsection will propose a 
number of different technical implementations. 
3.1 Technical Background 
Communication between two computers over modern 
network protocols requires the use of what is known as a 
network socket. A socket is a tuple of data used to identify 
each unique and active connection on a particular machine, 
and a socket pair is a tuple containing information for both the 
local and remote sockets [7]. While the exact contents of this 
tuple will vary depending on which transport protocol is being 
used, the TCP socket pair includes the IP addresses of both 
machines as well as the port numbers each machine has 
committed to the session. The IP addresses help the computer 
keep track of which remote machine it is communication with, 
while the port numbers help keep track of individual sessions 
for that machine. This 4-tuple allows two computers to 
manage thousands of unique conversations between them 
without risk of data loss on any one session. For example, a 
web client can make two distinct GET requests to a particular 
the web server for different page elements at port 80. Because 
they are two separate requests, different source port numbers 
are selected by the client (i.e. port 1,111 for one socket pair, 
and port 2,222 for the second socket pair) so the server knows 
which remote socket to feed the appropriate HTML response.  
While most services are given a dedicated port number 
with which to manage all connections, client ports are not 
static and will not always be the same under normal 
operation. Instead, the source port is generally a pseudo-
random number selected from a given range. Ports selected 
like this are known as ephemeral or temporary ports. This 
gives the client operating system flexibility when establishing 
new connections. There is technically nothing to prevent a 
client from using any port within the 16 bit port range (ports 0 
through 65,535) but there are suggested standard ranges 
which most transport layer protocol implementations observe. 
A commonly observed range is maintained by the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) which mandates that 
the two most significant bits must be registered as ones, 
giving a usable ephemeral range of 49,152 through 65,535 for 
a total of 16,384 available ports [8]. While Microsoft 
operating systems now follow the recommended IANA range, 
legacy Microsoft systems, such as Windows XP and 2000, 
use the range 1,025 through 5,000 for a total of 3,976 
available ports [9]. Linux systems tend to vary from 
distribution to distribution but most use either the IANA 
mandate or the range 32,768 through 61,000 for a total of 
28,233 available ports. 
3.2 Transport Layer Covert Channel 
The following method takes advantage of the flexibility 
provided by layer four protocols in source port selection and 
can be applied to any type of network environment that uses a 
layer four protocol, such as TCP and UDP. It consists of a 
sender, which will transmit data over the channel, and a 
receiver, which will collects the transmitted data. The sender 
and receiver must be able to communicate in some legitimate 
fashion without being flagged by a security appliance. For 
example, this pair might be a web server and client (TCP), a 
streaming media server and client (UDP), or some proprietary 
protocol.  
Each time a new source port is needed there is an 
opportunity to transmit up to sixteen bits of information from 
the client to the server in that source port field. A one-way 
channel is established when a user or process manipulates the 
source port to send data. Because all that is modified for this 
channel is the contents of a mandatory static length field, it 
can easily be piggybacked on top of legitimate traffic. The 
channel lends itself to a large number of different encoding 
mechanisms, two of which will be outlined in the next section.  
While it is possible to use these bits to transmit 
absolute data (i.e. sending an ASCII ‘A’ by using port 65), the 
channel is made more covert and robust by using the delta 
between two consecutive source ports. Using a delta scheme, 
no data is actually stored in a given source port; an analyst 
could investigate the totality of a guilty packet and find no 
leaked data. By contrast, absolute data transmission can easily 
be detected by an analyst reviewing a packet. Further, delta 
schemes lower the likelihood of colliding consecutive source 
ports because repeated characters will not use the same port 
number. These collisions could cause problems if the channel 
is run over legitimate traffic [10].  
Bandwidth for this channel might appear to be limited 
because of the tendency of most transport layer protocols, 
particularly TCP, to use one socket per session. However, it is 
not atypical for multiple sessions to be generated per task. For 
example, when a typical web browser retrieves the HTML 
document, style sheet, images and other elements from a 
single web page it will frequently establish several sessions 
with the remote server so that it can make many requests at a 
time, enhancing protocol performance. Each of those requests 
uses a different ephemeral source port, meaning that simply 
accessing a lone web site with many elements can provide 
adequate cover for this channel at high bandwidths. Similarly, 
any protocol that takes advantage of parallel network sessions 
could support high bandwidths with this channel.  
If the sender and receiver communicate on a regular 
basis the channel does not need to generate any new traffic. If 
they do not normally communicate, there is much flexibility 
in the traffic that can be used because of the application-
neutral nature of the channel. Virtually any protocol can be 
selected for packet generation. This makes the channel simple 
to customize for any number of environments without raising 
the suspicions of common security appliances or analysts.  
The channel does have a number of inherent 
weaknesses. For instance, the prolific use of network address 
translation technology (NAT) stands to limit the utility of the 
channel as described. This is because many NAT 
implementations modify the socket pair so that the source port 
received by the receiver cannot be reliably controlled. As 
such, if the sender lays behind a NAT box this channel is 
limited to communicating with other machines behind the 
NAT box. Similarly, proxy servers typically change the socket 
pair, again limiting the applicable scope of the channel. 
Sometimes the use of proxy servers is enforced even within a 
LAN, potentially crippling the channel. Legitimate traffic 
from the sender can possibly interfere with the channel in two 
separate ways. First, if another unrelated process makes use of 
an ephemeral port, that port will be locked from other 
processes until the TIME_WAIT timer expires. This timer, 
built into TCP with RFC793, is designed to ensure that the 
socket can still properly handle traffic arriving late from a 
closed connection [10]. If the source port required for the next 
data transmission is still in TIME_WAIT, a poorly written or 
light implementation might crash. While it is possible to work 
around this issue, higher level permissions are generally 
required. Second, if the sender and receiver communicate for 
some legitimate reason outside of the channel process it is 
possible that the receiver misinterprets the source port used in 
that exchange as part of the message, corrupting the data and 
calling to question the integrity of data received over this 
channel. This last problem can be effectively eliminated by 
using a robust encoding mechanism like the one discussed in 
subsection 4.2.  
 
3.3 Potential Implementations 
This method can be implemented in any number of 
ways ranging from the very clumsy to the very elegant. A 
simple implementation might generate false traffic with no 
real purpose other than providing a medium for the channel. 
Such an implementation would have high bandwidth but 
would be easy to identify as it would carry no changing data 
except for the source port. A more sophisticated version might 
act as a local wrapper for applications to use which would 
replace source port addresses for packets it receives and map 
it back to the original address, not unlike the basic 
functionality of NAT. Legitimate client applications could be 
a modified to take advantage of the channel. For example, a 
web browser can be modified to use the proper ephemeral port 
unless it is communicating with the intended receiving server, 
in which case it would use encoded delta ports instead of 
standard ephemeral ports. 
A much more elegant approach than these might 
include a kernel level modification on the sender. For 
instance, every time any application communicates with the 
intended receiver, the sender kernel selects encoded delta 
ports. An implementation like this would eliminate the need to 
manage redundancy checking (discussed in section 4.2), 
greatly improving bandwidth while only using legitimate user 
traffic to transmit data. 
 
4 Encoding Mechanisms 
4.1  Simple Encoding Schemes 
One example of a simple delta encoding scheme for 
this channel is to use the difference between two raw 
consecutive port numbers as the value to be transmitted. For 
example, if a user wanted to transmit the message “ABC” 
over the channel, they might first start a session with the 
source port 50,000, followed by 50,065, then 50,131, and 
finally 50,198. The differences between each port are 65, 66, 
and 67 respectively, which are the values of the ASCII 
decimal representations of the above message. This is 
represented visually in table 1 where the non-italicized bits 
carry the encoded data.  
Table 1: Basic 8-bit Encoding of “ABC” 
Port Binary Representation 
50,000 1100 0011 0101 0000 
50,065 1100 0011 1001 0001 
50,131 1100 0011 1101 0011 
50,198 1100 0100 0001 0110 
 
As mentioned above, IANA recommends that the first 
two bits be set to one for ephemeral ports and, although the 
range is not a technical limit, traffic coming from any port not 
adhering to this rule may trigger a signature in an intrusion 
detection system or fail to pass through an internal firewall 
[11]. For that reason this encoding scheme should comply 
with IANA recommendations, giving the scheme a port range 
between 49,152 and 65,535. Once the upper limit of this range 
has been reached, the numbers can loop around to the bottom 
range picking up where they left off. This function is 
described in Equation 1 where      and      are the range 
limits, V is the value to be transmitted,    is the current port 
and    is the next port to be used. For example, if the last port 
used was 65,500 (  ) and the next value to be transmitted is 
65 (V), it is clear that the port number is going to need to loop 
as the port 65,565 is beyond the upper limit. The difference of 
the 65,535 (    ) and the last port used should be subtracted 
from the value to be transmitted. The sum of that difference 
and 49,152 (      minus 1 is the next port to be used. In this 
case, the next port would be 49,181 (  ). 
 
        (   (        )    (1) 
This encoding scheme is somewhat inefficient. The 
problem is that no more than eight of the sixteen bits are ever 
being used at a time as the difference will never exceed 256. 
To increase efficiency while staying within the guidelines set 
forward by IANA, twelve or fourteen bits could be used on a 
rolling basis. Table 2 illustrates how a twelve bit 
implementation might encode the ASCII message “ABC”. 
Note that the first four bits, shown in italics, are ignored. The 
remaining bits are concatenated with the other port bits and 
interpreted as a single binary string. A twelve bit encoding 
mechanism such as this would enjoy 50% better throughput 
that the eight bit counterpart outlined earlier, and a 14 
fourteen bit representation would have 75% better throughput.  
Table 2: Basic 12-bit Encoding of “ABC” 
Port Binary Representation 
49,156 1100 0000 0000 0100 
49,539 1100 0001 1000 0011 
52,320 1100 1100 0110 0000 
 
In some cases an implementation might not need to 
worry about the IANA port standard and would be free to use 
all sixteen bits. It may seem logical to simply divide the port 
bits in half and use the difference between them, but this 
method would forfeit the major benefit of delta encoding 
because the data would be completely contained in a single 
port number, making it easier for an analyst or security 
appliance to identify the channel and discover the data being 
transmitted. If a full sixteen bit scheme is selected, a better 
solution would be to use the delta between the first byte from 
two ports, followed by the delta between the first byte from 
the second port and the second byte of the first port. Finally, 
the delta between the second byte of the first port and the 
second byte of the second port is considered. At that point the 
pattern can be reversed and the cycle can continue. This is 
demonstrated in table 3.  
Table 3: Simple 16-bit Encoding of “ABC” 
Port Binary Representation 
131 0000 0000 1000 0011 
19,654 0100 1100 1100 0110 
 
4.2  Advanced Encoding Schemes 
While functional, the above basic encoding methods 
can be problematic. The first major issue with these schemes, 
especially the eight bit scheme in particular, is that they are 
easy to identify. Second, they are all prone to data corruption. 
As discussed above, there is a risk that legitimate, unrelated 
communication between the sender and received could 
interfere with the channel by using source port numbers 
within the next delta range. There are 16,384 available 
ephemeral ports in the IANA suggested range, meaning the 
above eight bit implementation of the channel could be 
disrupted by an ephemeral selection of anywhere between 256 
and 512 ports. This translates to a chance of data corruption 
between 1.56% and 3.13% for every unrelated source port 
number. While some practical implementations might be 
willing to call this acceptable loss in exchange for simplicity 
and bandwidth, there may be cases where a more robust 
approach is needed. In these cases improvements can be made 
to the encoding mechanism. One such improvement is defined 
below.  
This more advanced encoding method uses the 
available bits left over from the data encoding scheme to help 
verify the contents of the next packet. In the previously 
discussed eight-bit scheme there remain eight bits in the 
sixteen bit port number which is further cut to six bits due to 
the IANA ephemeral port definition discussed above. The 
ones in the following bit string represent the bits in question: 
0011 1111 0000 0000. 
These bits will be used as a redundancy check (RC) to 
verify that the next source port received is, indeed, part of the 
message. To achieve this, an “exclusive or” (XOR) operation 
is run between the data bits of the current source port and the 
data bits of the previous source port. The resulting bit string is 
truncated to fit the available RC bits, depending on 
implementation. This method leaves the very first source port 
in the chain without data to XOR. To address this problem, 
both machines will share a key the same length as the RC bits. 
The RC bits in the first source port sent will be the result of an 
XOR between that key and the data bits to be transmitted. 
When these port numbers are considered in context, it is very 
easy to identify and ignore ports that are not a part of the 
message, greatly increasing data integrity. This process is 
illustrated in figure 1 and an 8 bit example is given in table 4. 
Note that the two leading IANA bits are in italics and ignored. 
The six bold bits for a given port are the result of an XOR 
operation between the data bits in that port and the data bits of 
the previous port or the initialization key. 
Table 4: Advanced 8-bit Encoding of "ABC" 
Port Binary Representation 
Key 10101010 
49,643 11 000001 11101011 
50,478 11 000101 00101110 
57,201 11 011111 01110001 
 
Figure 1: Advanced Encoding Process 
This method allows only two bits worth of remaining 
offending ephemeral ports, or four ports total. This lowers the 
chance of data corruption to 0.02%. It should also be noted 
that this modified encoding scheme has the additional 
advantage of being more difficult for an analyst or security 
appliance to detect as it maintains the advantage of being 
present only in the delta while making the delta harder to 
discover and making the raw source ports jump around. 
Once again, this encoding scheme stands functional but 
imperfect. If an implementation has no need to adhere to the 
IANA port standard, a much improved scheme can be 
developed. While maintaining eight data bits a full set of eight 
RC bits could be committed to the channel, leaving no chance 
of data corruption by unrelated traffic due to a perfect XOR. If 
the next legitimate port happens to be selected by an unrelated 
program, the real source port would be ignored due to 
incorrect RC bits, leaving no corruption. An example of this 
can be seen in table 5.  
Table 5: Advanced 8-bit Encoding of "ABC"; not IANA 
Compliant 
Port Binary Representation 
Key 10101010 
16,875 01000001 11101011 
50,478 11000101 00101110 
24,433 01011111 01110001 
 
Even if IANA standards must be adhered to, an 
improved implementation is possible with an encoding 
implementation which uses seven data bits instead of eight. 
There would be seven RC bits remaining to ensure integrity, 
leaving no chance of data corruption by unrelated traffic for 
the same reason outlined above. An example of this can be 
seen in table 6. 
Table 6: Advanced 7-bit Encoding of "ABC" 
Port Binary Representation 
Key 10101010 
61,429 11 1011111 1110101 
57,163 11 0111110 1001011 
49,870 11 0000101 1001110 
61,200 11 1011110 0010000 
 
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
This work presented a new method for leveraging 
transport layer source ports as a covert channel. A number of 
implementation models were discussed, including an efficient 
and covert kernel modification. Additionally, a wide variety 
of encoding schemes were proposed and reviewed on their 
merit. These contributions open the door to a number of new 
methods that warrant further work. 
One method that may be worth exploring for future 
work is a channel which duplicates regular network traffic 
while changing the source port in the duplicate packet. Instead 
of using live packets as the medium for the channel, a local 
listener on the sender could wait for outgoing traffic destined 
for the receiver. Once the traffic is identified, the sender will 
create duplicate packets of the legitimate traffic, changing the 
source port in each packet to encode the leaking data. In this 
instance, the encoded delta is between the legitimate packet 
and the modified packet, as opposed to the delta between two 
modified packets. This approach has some advantages. First, 
legitimate traffic will not have any effect on the channel; 
whatever ephemeral source port is selected, the modified 
duplicate packet will be able to use whatever port it needs for 
the encoding as it will not actually open the socket advertised 
locally. Similarly, there is no need to worry about 
TIME_WAIT status of the sockets because the socket is never 
actually opened. Finally, this approach will allow a much 
higher bandwidth in a TCP environment as it will not need to 
establish a connection for each delta. The primary 
disadvantage to this technique is that it dissolves the features 
that make source port delta channels appealing from the 
perspective of covertness. There would be a high amount of 
unusual traffic over the network, making it easy to tell that 
some sort of communication is going on. Further, the new 
packets are exact duplicated of legitimate traffic except for the 
source port, making it easy for an analyst to identify the 
source ports as suspicious and possibly leading to the 
discovery of the transmitted data. 
Another promising method involves using destination 
ports in UDP as a way to transmit data. On many UDP 
protocols, when a server receives a connection from a client it 
replies back with a new port listed for this particular client to 
use. This method allows UDP protocols to keep track of 
different “connections” without the benefit of TCP 
connectivity facilities. However, there is no limit to this port 
switching technique and it may be feasible to leverage rapid 
port switching deltas as a covert channel. There would be 
some distinct advantages to this method, including that the 
channel would survive NAT and proxy interference. Further, 
since the role of the sender and receiver is swapped, this 
method shows promise as a medium for covert command and 
control. A disadvantage associated with this method is that it 
would be inherently lossy. 
Detection of this channel has yet to be researched. One 
approach could be comparing the rapidly changing port 
numbers to ordinary network traffic patterns. It may be 
possible to identify or prevent this channel by noting source 
port selection outside a standard variance. 
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